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Abstract: The number of microfinance institutions (MFIs) making small
loans to the developing world’s poor has grown to over 7,000. With growth
has come increasing competition for scarce funding. Few MFIs have reached
self-sufficiency, and fewer still have made the transition to regulated financial institutions. Comparing the performance of MFIs that have attained
self-sufficiency with those that have not and comparing both to regional
commercial banks in developing countries on selected financial ratios
reveals self-sufficient MFIs are strong performers on ROA and ROE. The
majority of MFIs, however, are very weak and in need of continued subsidies.
Providing financial services to the poor is an expensive proposition and
may mean numerous MFIs will not reach self-sufficiency.

n the middle ground between wholly subsidized and regulated institutions, a growing number of microfinance institutions (MFIs) have attained sustainability without yet
achieving regulated status. Many of these institutions are working
on the time-consuming process of meeting requirements to apply
to become regulated institutions. The greater levels of equity capital required to attain the status of a regulated institution are
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available only to those MFIs with a high degree of reporting
transparency and increased efficiency in business practices.
Even for those MFIs not yet considered sustainable, an avowed
goal of at least improving operational efficiency has become an
important criteria expected by many organizations willing to
provide capital. Comparing financial ratios and other operating data of the subsidized and the sustainable MFIs with each
other and with regional commercial banks can provide insight
into the progress MFIs have or have not made toward sustainability. Comparing performance with the commercial sector
also points out where differences exist. These comparisons are
made by matching regionalized aggregate data of MFIs as selfreported to the Microbanking Bulletin with data reported by
commercial banks by region. 1 Aggregate data on sustainable
MFIs worldwide and aggregate developing-world commercial
banks are also compared for this purpose.

Sustainability
Sustainability is defined as “a program’s capacity to remain
financially viable in the absence of domestic subsidies or foreign support” (Woolcock, 1999). Financial self-sufficiency
requires the ability to cover at least 99.5% of expenses exclusive of subsidies or grants (Microbanking, 2001). By definition,
sustainability includes generating sufficient profit to cover
expenses while eliminating all subsidies, even those lessobvious subsidies, such as loans made in hard currency with
repayment in local currency.

Paradox of Sustainable Microfinance Institutions
The poverty alleviation/self-sufficiency paradox underscores
the trade-off between effective service leading to poverty
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reduction and financial self-sufficiency. Focusing on sustainability and profitability might lead MFIs to seek to make larger
loans to better-off clients in order to gain economies of scale
that would both minimize expenses per loan and increase the
probability of repayment. Such a strategy, while moving an
MFI toward sustainability, would once again leave the poor
with limited access to capital. A balance between larger, more
likely to be repaid loans and the continuance of smaller loans
to the poor can serve both goals. The balance will be difficult
to attain, but a financially sustainable MFI will be able to
increase borrowing in private-capital markets, adding to its
ability to loan money (Gibbons and Meehan, 1999). Without
sustainability, MFIs are not a going concern, making the goal
of poverty alleviation unreachable (Otero, 1999).
Since MFIs have only been able to reach several million of
the many million poor, there is constant pressure to expand.
Expanding to service more of the poor and, increasingly, the
less able to repay, necessitates more capital. At the margin,
added capital is more difficult to obtain, requiring higher levels of financial sustainability and all the associated reporting
requirements that entails. One avenue to attain operating sustainability, although not necessarily without elimination of all
subsidies, is to increase profits by raising interest rates, fees, or
both. However this method shuts out those least able to repay
and increases default rates.
The strategy of extending loan services to more people in
order to achieve economies of scale can lead to increasing bad
debts if not done properly (Gulli, 1998). Overall, through
economies of scale attained by judicious expansion and loan
diversification, the larger MFIs that reach more people tend to
move closer toward sustainability.

Financial Sustainability
As the number of MFIs has dramatically increased, their main
source of funds, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), has
gained leverage in demanding more transparent accounting, audits,
and, in some cases, clear plans to attain financial sustainability.
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Most of the estimated 7,000 MFIs have fewer than 3,000 clients
and less than a 95% repayment record (Garber, 1997). Many of
these organizations have been unable to control administrative
costs. For some MFIs, high administrative costs are simply a way
of doing business that enables staff members to earn a living
through the generosity of NGO subsidies. Job creation in the
MFI itself was not the original goal, though for some, job sustainability may have become more important than minimizing
expenses. This is no longer a viable strategy. Competitiveness in
the market for funds is prompting a return to the original MFI
mission motivated by a need for continuing access to capital.
The possibility of comparing publicly available audited
statements of a significant number of MFIs with any MFI seeking funding may inspire some MFIs to alter financial figures to
reflect a more robust performance than actual (Woolcock,
1999). Lack of transparency or even outright dishonesty creates
difficulties for NGOs seeking to determine which MFIs can
best use funding. Increasingly, NGOs require MFIs to adapt
standard accounting practices to ease comparisons. Accion
Camel has been adopted by a growing number of MFIs to
report a variety of financial measures, such as capital adequacy,
asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity management
(Saltzman & Salinger, 1998). Accion Camel is a modification of
the Camel system used by U.S. commercial lenders. Using the
same principles applied to commercial banks, Accion Camel
adjusts some of the figures to account for differences between
commercial lending and MFI practices. The result of an Accion
Camel audit is a rating on a scale of one to five, providing a
basis for comparing MFIs’ performances. Adaptation of Camel
to MFIs is useful but imperfect. Benchmarks are useful when
standardized commercial banks are being compared is but they
can be less helpful when comparing far more diverse MFIs,
which differ by region, client base, size, and culture. A specific
MFI could have few comparable institutions to be benchmarked
against. The cost of the Accion Camel system also effectively
limits such an audit to the more successful MFIs.
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Many MFIs have avoided audits or the more expensive
Accion Camel for lack of funds or expertise or because of a
desire to limit outside examination. Moving the process of formalized financial reporting to a greater level of transparency
inevitably will be up to the NGOs that supply capital. In some
cases, it may be necessary to subsidize audits.
The lack of widely used comparable accounting standards
makes comparing MFIs difficult. The data contained in the
Microbanking Bulletin, released by the Microbanking
Standards Project, which this study examines and many
NGOs have relied on, is self-reported. The vast majority of
MFIs do not submit data, which creates selection bias. Those
who do provide data tend to be more successful. Any conclusions from the proceeding analysis will therefore be somewhat
limited. That has been the nature of MFI analysis—limited
data followed by limited conclusions. Nevertheless, continuing to examine the financial information that is available
establishes benchmarks that funding organizations can refer to
and perhaps use as leverage to encourage greater transparency
and more participation in reporting.
Aggregate MFI financial data is segmented by region while
MFIs identified as sustainable cut across all regions, with no
indication of how many of these elite institutions are from any
particular region. Within regions there can be large economic
and demographic disparities. For example, Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh are in the same region but differ greatly in population density and levels of poverty. Commercial bank data is
combined by region for comparison to regional MFIs and aggregated across all developing countries for comparison to sustainable MFIs. Commercial banks are by no means immune to
mixed levels of prosperity and business practices within the
same region. Africa includes institutions from such diverse
countries as South Africa, Morocco, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. An
additional problem is that within regions, commercial banks
reporting may be from countries different from those of
reporting MFIs. Since there is no way of knowing the specific
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countries due to the anonymity of MFI reporting, regional
comparisons will be broadly assumed.

Methodology
Five financial ratios from three different categories are the
basis for the comparisons. In the first category, the ratio of
operating expenses to assets measures efficiency. The second
category, gauging profitability, includes the return on assets
(net income divided by total assets), return on equity (net
income divided by total equity), and net profit margin (net
profit divided by sales). The final category, measuring leverage,
is represented by the debt-to-equity ratio (total debt divided by
total equity).
Commercial bank data is obtained from FISonline, covering
four geographic regions: Africa (14 banks), Asia (61 banks),
eastern Europe (10 banks), and Latin America (72 banks). The
information obtained is most often from 2001 filings, with
earlier fiscal years used when they are the most recent available. Banks from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, and
Morocco represent Africa. Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, and
Thailand represent Asia. Eastern Europe is represented by the
Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, and Latvia. Representing
Latin America are Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia.
The second and third data series are as reported by the
Microbanking Standards Project (MSP). All of the data in this
set comes from the November 2001 issue of the Microbanking
Bulletin (MBB). MFIs submitted information dated from
March 1999 to March 2001, with most of the information dated
December 2000. The second series is an aggregated group of 57
financially self-sufficient MFIs.
The data series includes aggregated information from all
regions of the world and consists of average ratios by region
for all MFIs and globally for all self-sufficient MFIs. Standard
deviations across all self-sufficient MFIs are provided, but
regional standard deviations are not given, precluding statistical tests.
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Of the 148 reported MFIs, 57 are self-sufficient. The total
includes 59 from Latin America, 36 from Africa, 29 from Asia,
and 24 from eastern Europe. Because the MSP’s policy is not to
release information on individual banks, in order to protect privacy, it releases information on an aggregate basis. The MSP uses
subcategories such as cooperatives and institution size within a
geographic area. To obtain the aggregate data for one particular
region, an average consisting of the individual components is
calculated. Ratios and intermediary data not directly reported in
MFI data are calculated on the basis of reported information.

Total
It is also necessary to derive one ratio for commercial banks as
well. Both assets and equity are taken as reported at the end of
the reporting period for both MFIs and commercial banks.
Since assets and equity can vary during the course of a year,
taking quarterly averages would provide more accurate ratio
calculations. Such an adjustment, while possible for some of
the commercial banks reporting, was not possible for the
annual data available for MFIs and was therefore not done for
any of the data. The practice of using end-of-year balance-sheet
figures to calculate ratios is widespread and should not greatly
affect the results since it is done consistently.
MBB adjusts raw MFI data for inflation, subsidies, and loanloss provisions in order to standardize information. MFIs submit
data by completing a questionnaire on accounting practices and
auditing to aid in the elimination and minimization of any data
that might be suspect. Accounting standards may vary by region.

Analysis
Table 1 compares self-sufficient MFIs with commercial banks.
On both return on assets and return on equity, self-sufficient
MFIs are statistically significantly superior to commercial
banks from comparable countries. MFIs likely have smaller
equity and asset bases than commercial banks, in part explaining their superior performance. Smaller equity bases magnify
Volume 6 Number 1
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Table 1. Comparison of self-sufficient MFIs with all
commercial banks’ sustainability
MFI average
aggregate

Category

Commercial bank
average difference
(MFI-Commercial bank)
131.54

Assets

0.260

ROE

15.5010

462.19a

ROA

5.101

495.03b

15.4011

451.94

Net proﬁt margin
Debt/Equity

1.45

T-statistic oper. exp./ p < 0.01
a

1.60–0.33
b

p < 0.05

the impact of profitability. The origin of MFI equity is also
typically quite different from equity invested in commercial
institutions. More often than not, MFI equity is donated.
Equity in commercial banks is invested or represents retained
earnings. MFI equity donors may initially expect social returns
but likely reach a point where they want to see the MFI become
self-sufficient. The MFIs that achieve self-sufficiency, such as
those in the sample compared with commercial banks, are making financial profits and are achieving positive ROE. Therefore,
the MFI sample of those that have attained self-sufficiency is
likely biased toward more profitable MFIs, whereas the commercial bank sample does not eliminate banks that are losing money.
There is the possibility that self-sufficient MFIs with positive ROEs may be attaining those results by reducing levels of
services to the poorest of the poor—those with the greater
needs. The cost of servicing the poorest with smaller loans can
reduce financial-profit margins. There is a trade-off between
financial ROE and social returns. Increased pressure to attain
self-sufficiency, even from initial equity donors, could have
motivated some MFIs to make larger, more profitable loans to
more viable clients, reducing servicing costs. Self-sufficient MFIs
are likely to have been operating for a longer period of time and
benefit from repeat borrowers who have both a track record of
repayment and a basic understanding of the loan process.
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Operating expense as a percentage of assets is considerably
higher for self-sufficient MFIs than for commercial banks,
though not statistically significant. It is also true that the mission of MFIs is quite different from that of commercial banks
and often includes borrower education, which significantly
increases operating expenses. Commercial banks also have a
larger asset base than MFIs, which would also tend to make
this ratio appear more favorable for them.
MFIs have higher profit margins than commercial banks,
though not statistically significant, in part because they charge
higher interest rates. In conjunction with lower operating profits
to assets ratio, this seems to indicate that it is in fact the smaller
asset base that is the major factor leading to better operating to
assets ratio for commercial banks. Superior net profit margins
for MFIs shows that expenses, though they are higher relative to
assets, are more than adequately covered most likely due to
higher interest rates charged by MFIs than commercial banks.
It is not surprising that commercial banks, with historically greater access to capital, use their larger equity (and asset
bases) to gain greater leverage, as represented by the higher
debt and equity ratios. What is interesting is that the difference
is so small and not statistically significant. MFIs are borrowing
approximately at the same rate, adjusted for their smaller
equity base. Excluding subsidies, it is also quite likely that
MFIs borrow at a higher interest rate while still achieving
stronger profit margins. Commercial banks can obtain broader
equity investment and borrow more against that equity at
lower interest rates, lowering their operating-expense-to-assets
ratio, but they are apparently less efficient in generating profits
than self-sufficient MFIs. Commercial banks likely have higher
salary structures and appear to have overall greater operating
costs than self-sufficient MFIs even though it is well known
that smaller MFI loans are more costly to service. As suggested
before, self-sufficient MFIs may have migrated toward larger,
less costly loans and, problematically to their mission, away
from loans to the poorest.
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Superior ROA for self-sufficient MFIs further illustrates
how well MFIs use their smaller asset base. The difference in
ROA is the only measure that is statistically significant, at the
1% level. This difference further demonstrates that the lower
operating-expenses-to-assets ratio achieved by banks is largely
due to a larger asset base. Self-sufficient MFIs, which have
smaller assets, are able to employ them more efficiently.
When the data is taken in the aggregate by region as
reported by MBB, the superiority shown by self-sufficient
MFIs is overwhelmed by both the greater number of MFIs that
have not reached self-sufficiency and their poorer performance. 2
One factor that could explain some of the large performance
gap is that MBB requires MFIs to report expenses for training
not directly related to lending. This inclusion seems appropriate
since it is important to educate first-time borrowers, but it
makes comparisons with profit-seeking commercial banks
somewhat more difficult because commercial banks have no
social obligation to serve the poor. Such expenses dampen
profits and even more so for MFIs that have not attained selfsufficiency. The superiority of commercial banks to MFIs
overall also points to the fact that self-sufficient MFIs are quite
different institutions from MFIs in the aggregate. Self-sufficient
MFIs may have moved away from the more expensive mission
of servicing the poorest of the poor.
Both ROA and ROE, so favorable for self-sufficient MFIs,
are negative for aggregate MFIs across all regions. Since the 57
self-sufficient MFIs of the 148 reporting performed so strongly
on ROE and ROA, the other MFIs are necessarily performing
quite poorly to have reduced the ratios to such a degree.
Negative profit margins across all regions emphasize the gap
between all MFIs and the subsample of self-sufficient MFIs.
Without subsidies most MFIs would cease to exist.
African commercial banks are the strongest, with the lowest
operating expenses as a percentage of assets, just 2%, considerably
ahead of the second best performer, eastern Europe, at 8%.
Some of the African commercial bank superiority may be
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Table 2. Comparison of MFIs and commercial banks by region
Category
Operating expenses

Africa
MFIs
CBs

Asia
MFIs CBs

Eastern Europe Latin America
MFIs CBs
MFIs CBs

0.28

0.06

0.45

0.15

0.29

0.08

0.28

0.14

ROE

15.59

20.20

15.29

6.29

14.17

13.51

8.84

11.45

ROA

8.45

3.12

0.77

1.12

4.20

1.51

4.061

1.48

33.95

26.97

9.90

7.21

16.97

21.74

18.50

10.45

1.5

10.68

2.86

2.00

0.79

2.81

1.45

0.81

Net profit margin
Debt/Equity ration

because this sample includes South African banks with large
amounts of assets. African MFIs are also the strongest regionally
on the same measure, though they are quite comparable to
MFIs in eastern Europe and Latin America. The weakest region
is Asia, both for commercial banks and MFIs. This could reflect
the financial damage done by the Asian economic crisis, which
may have left both banks and MFIs with lower levels of assets
because of still-weakened currencies. These lower levels of
assets would magnify operating costs as a percentage of assets.
Other factors contributing to differences across regions could
be government regulations and the extent of competition,
including the presence or absence of foreign-owned banks.
African MFIs are the weakest on profit margin, with considerable losses that would make them clearly unsustainable
without subsidies. Asian MFIs are the strongest on profit margin, though still losing money. Asian commercial banks are the
weakest compared with other regional commercial banks, possibly somewhat due to continued write-downs of losses from
prior years. It may be that Asian MFIs weathered the Asian
currency crisis better than their commercial counterparts, possibly because of maintaining loans in only local currency while
retaining the ability to obtain hard-cash infusions from NGOs.
MFI loans are also short-term unlike commercial loans, which
are still at risk of default for years after an economy recovers.
Asian commercial banks have yet to recover from the reduction
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in the value of their assets; recovery will make ROA stronger
if there are more than meager profits. The fact that Asian MFIs
have the best ROA and the weakest profit margin, both negative, indicates their asset bases are also small.
The strength of African and eastern-European commercial
bank profit margins compared to very negative performances
by African MFIs and negative figures by eastern-European
MFIs points out the type of market segmentation discussed earlier. Commercial banks focus on highly profitable loans while
MFIs service the poor. Although self-sufficient MFIs did very
well matched against commercial banks, when combined with
MFIs that are not self-sufficient, overall profits are impacted
greatly by the need to spend money to support and educate
borrowers. Even with higher interest rates, most MFIs are not
covering expenses. It may be that the majority of MFIs cannot
attain profitability without radically altering their operations
through cutting expenses and the cost of servicing loans. Doing
so, however, would preclude loans to the poorest clientele,
who incur the highest costs.
Commercial banks in eastern Europe have the highest
debt-to-equity ratio among banks while eastern-European
MFIs have the lowest debt-to-equity ratio among MFIs. It
could be that eastern-European MFIs are attracting more
equity in the form of donations than MFIs in other regions.
Also, it is likely considerably easier for commercial banks in
eastern Europe to borrow from the developed world, and certainly Europe, the region their efforts are focused on. In Asia,
MFIs have greater leverage than commercial banks. This could
be due to the more rapidly shrinking equity base likely to be
denominated in local currency versus the commercial banking
sector’s substantial portion of debt obligations in foreign currency. African and Latin American MFIs also have higher debt
and equity ratios than commercial banks. One explanation for
this could be a shift from outright grants to MFIs to greater
reliance on market-based or subsidized loans.
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Conclusion
In the aggregate sample, MFIs in every region are unprofitable
and far worse performers than their geographic commercial
peers. It is encouraging that the 57 self-sufficient MFIs are profitable and even performing better than developing-world commercial banks in the sample. These MFIs can stand on their
own and survive. However, the larger universe of MFIs, including
the thousands who do not report to MBB, are likely doing considerably worse than even the aggregate MBB sample, which
itself is well below the self-sufficient MFIs.
Would the poor be better served if efforts and funds were
concentrated on the self-sufficient MFIs? Without detailed data
it is difficult to answer this question; however, it is likely that
the self-sufficient MFIs are “skimming” the best clientele as
well as operating more efficiently. They may not be servicing
the smallest and costliest loans to the poor.
If it is the goal of MFIs to become more like commercial
banks, then the sample of self-sufficient MFIs indicates they are
progressing toward that aim. However, if MFIs are to continue
to service the poor and to expand that service to the even larger
multitudes that have not yet had any access to capital, profitability will necessarily be elusive. The market economy cannot impose market-based efficiencies on all MFIs and expect the
poor to have access to capital. Some, if not the large majority of
MFIs, will continue to require subsidies since their mission is
not just to provide capital to be repaid with interest but also to
service and educate the borrowers in managing that capital.
Without this additional service, only providing loans to the
poor would not succeed in improving their lives. This does not
mean that MFIs should get a free ride and not be subject to
financial scrutiny. Allocation of scarce capital by NGOs to the
most successful MFIs should be a priority, but allocation cannot be solely based on profitability of recipient institutions.
Wider social criteria should be included, some of which are
part of the Accion Camel analysis. A first step to attaining
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transparency and the most efficient allocation of capital would
be mandatory reporting of financial data to MBB with the
assistance of supporting NGOs. Included with the standard
financial data should be some standardized reporting to
demonstrate the attainment of social goals.

Notes
1. Microbanking Bulletin is now part of MIX Market, a much more accessible
database of MFI information. MFI comparisons can be made using a variety of
ﬁnancial data of 133 MFIs worldwide by using various screening and search criteria.
MIX Market also includes information on sources of funding information.
2. Since this analysis, the creation of MIX Market cited above allows for different aggregations of data, which makes possible more specific regional combinations
of MFIs and may enable more elaborate analysis.
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